This shows the Wehrmacht's advance on Moscow after they pass through Smolensk and then the transition into Operation Typhoon. This map also contains visuals of the Red Army's counterattack in December (Wiest and Jordon, 76).
Operation Typhoon
The specific name for the German plan for the attack on Moscow was
called Operation Typhoon. It began in mid-September and was
composed of “three armies, three panzer corps, and 78 divisions.”
This ensemble consisted of nearly 2 million men. The Soviet Union
at this time was outnumbered almost two to one, having mustered
1.2 million men and women divided amongst 3 fronts. It took the
German and their allies all of two weeks until they could be supported
by their supply lines until they launched the attack towards Moscow on September 30th. In early October the Germans had surrounded two
pockets of the Red Army at Bryansk and Vyazma and whole divisions
of men; numbering approximately 700,000, were forced to surrender after a quarter million of their comrades
succumbed to onslaught of the German mechanized machine (Braithwaite, 222). By October 5th, the Germans
were 80 miles from the gates of Moscow. Stalin could scarcely believe the reports on the scale of the German
invasion, nor the news of whole divisions being swallowed up. He was all for the execution of commanders who had
failed to stem the tide of the German attack, but he was dissuaded from this by one of his generals, General Zhukov,
who said that it would only hurt the morale of the Red Army (Braithwaite 225).
By mid-October the weather was beginning to change from sweltering heat to a bitterly cold winter. This weather phenomenon is known to the Russian people as rasputitsa. It is characterized by heavy torrential rainfall that
saturates the soil of the steppe. This had extraordinary consequences for the German Army as they approached
Moscow. As many of the roads in Russia were not paved and the choking dust that had been the bane of many of
the trucks and lorries in the summer would turn into a muddy quagmire (Braithwaite 9). No longer could the
German Army advance with the blitzkrieg speed they had been privy to in Poland, France, or their sudden attack
on Russia in June of 1941. The Germans were unprepared for how the weather and road conditions would affect
their operation and lost their treasured strength of mobility. By the same token it also slowed the Soviet’s ability
to mobilize as well (Braithwaite 288-289). The German Army was weakened over the month of October losing
many of their vehicles to the mud decreasing their motor pool by two-thirds (Glantz 202). The first snow came on
October 7th and subsequently melted making the mud even more difficult to overcome. By the end of October the
German offensive halted so they could consolidate their forces and reorganize. (Braithwaite 233; Glantz 201)
On October 17th, the Soviet Union had erected the Mozhaisk Defense Line spanning more than 120 miles from the
Volga Reservoir to the north of Moscow to the city of Mozhaisk (see Map). Within this defensive shield the citizens
of Moscow went to work constructing intricate defensive structures such as trenches and moats in preparing for the
German Army and their panzers. Though this was forced labor, there were also volunteers who wished to join the
military force. These citizens even went so far as to establish a sniper school. Among the students were over 600
hundred women. These snipers would prove to be immensely successful in picking off German personnel and
demoralizing the Wehrmacht ,ultimately slowing down their advance towards Moscow (Braithwaite 227).
As Operation Typhoon moved into further into November, the weather was shifting to winter. The mud was freezing
and the German panzers were able to resume their advance, but they had already assumed 686,000 casualties
(Glantz 202). Hitler did order the Wehrmacht to resume their offensive on Moscow and they managed to take some
ground, but by this time the Soviet reserves were arriving from the East to fill in the defensive gaps. The senior
military leadership of the Soviet Union, Stavka, ordered in the early November the creation of “9 reserve armies
and, simultaneously 9 tank brigades, 49 separate tank battalions, and over 100 ski battalions by December 1 along
with 90,000 individual replacements for theWestern and Kalinin Front.” (Glantz 227-9)
The Russians were also making use of their ability to move again and they were reinforcing their defensive line with
men who were outfitted to white camouflage and clothing suitable for the harsh winter. Their misadventure in Finland
had revealed their unpreparedness for winter and they were keen on righting their mistakes (Braithwaite 289).
The Russians had bulked up their defense line with more guns and more tanks. Not all of the terrain on the Mozhaisk Defense Line was frozen and the mud made it impossible for the bulk of the Russian tanks to mount a counter attack.
It was still possible however for the Soviets to mount a cavalry attack with the aid of several T-34 tanks against the
German Panzers outflanking the great General Guderian (Braithwaite 294).
By December the Germans’ offensive had been suppressed. Both the German and Soviet forces were greeted by a severe drop in temperature reaching the negatives. This change in the weather was also when Stavka ordered the commencement of the Soviet counter offensive to be launched from the Western and Kalinin Front on December 5th. The fighting was brutal and the both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were locked in a war of attrition. The temperature was below 15 degrees and neither side saw a slack in the fighting. There were many technical issues due to the cold. Some of the German Panzers and lorries’ engines though running would suddenly shut down, the oil in the motors freezing. Additionally, there was snow that prevented the Panzers and infantry from being resupplied by the Luftwaffe (Glantz 232-5).
The Red Army was also on the move and Zhukov and other Stavka generals issued a directive to their commanders to always pursue. This tactic was to ensure that the Wehrmacht was always harassed and never able to let down their guard. However, they did not order them into a frontal attack, but instead encourage them to surround the German forces (Glantz 237). This dogged tactic could only be maintained because new men and equipment were flowing into region with each new day. The Soviet generals though facing severe pressure from General Secretary Stalin were slow and methodical in their efforts to destroy the Wehrmacht in front of Moscow. By December 16th, the Red Army had rolled back the German forces between 150-330 kilometers from the capital. Hitler’s generals began to request permission to retreat, but the Fuhrer remained steadfast in his dream to wipe from the earth the Soviet ideology that stood in direct conflict with the Nazi’s National Socialism. On Christmas day, General Guderian was relieved of his command. The Red Army continued to push tirelessly into the retreating Wehrmacht. By New Year’s Day it was apparent that Operation Typhoon had been a failure and the Soviet Union had changed the tide of the war and stole victory out of the hands of defeat (Glantz 246-250).
called Operation Typhoon. It began in mid-September and was
composed of “three armies, three panzer corps, and 78 divisions.”
This ensemble consisted of nearly 2 million men. The Soviet Union
at this time was outnumbered almost two to one, having mustered
1.2 million men and women divided amongst 3 fronts. It took the
German and their allies all of two weeks until they could be supported
by their supply lines until they launched the attack towards Moscow on September 30th. In early October the Germans had surrounded two
pockets of the Red Army at Bryansk and Vyazma and whole divisions
of men; numbering approximately 700,000, were forced to surrender after a quarter million of their comrades
succumbed to onslaught of the German mechanized machine (Braithwaite, 222). By October 5th, the Germans
were 80 miles from the gates of Moscow. Stalin could scarcely believe the reports on the scale of the German
invasion, nor the news of whole divisions being swallowed up. He was all for the execution of commanders who had
failed to stem the tide of the German attack, but he was dissuaded from this by one of his generals, General Zhukov,
who said that it would only hurt the morale of the Red Army (Braithwaite 225).
By mid-October the weather was beginning to change from sweltering heat to a bitterly cold winter. This weather phenomenon is known to the Russian people as rasputitsa. It is characterized by heavy torrential rainfall that
saturates the soil of the steppe. This had extraordinary consequences for the German Army as they approached
Moscow. As many of the roads in Russia were not paved and the choking dust that had been the bane of many of
the trucks and lorries in the summer would turn into a muddy quagmire (Braithwaite 9). No longer could the
German Army advance with the blitzkrieg speed they had been privy to in Poland, France, or their sudden attack
on Russia in June of 1941. The Germans were unprepared for how the weather and road conditions would affect
their operation and lost their treasured strength of mobility. By the same token it also slowed the Soviet’s ability
to mobilize as well (Braithwaite 288-289). The German Army was weakened over the month of October losing
many of their vehicles to the mud decreasing their motor pool by two-thirds (Glantz 202). The first snow came on
October 7th and subsequently melted making the mud even more difficult to overcome. By the end of October the
German offensive halted so they could consolidate their forces and reorganize. (Braithwaite 233; Glantz 201)
On October 17th, the Soviet Union had erected the Mozhaisk Defense Line spanning more than 120 miles from the
Volga Reservoir to the north of Moscow to the city of Mozhaisk (see Map). Within this defensive shield the citizens
of Moscow went to work constructing intricate defensive structures such as trenches and moats in preparing for the
German Army and their panzers. Though this was forced labor, there were also volunteers who wished to join the
military force. These citizens even went so far as to establish a sniper school. Among the students were over 600
hundred women. These snipers would prove to be immensely successful in picking off German personnel and
demoralizing the Wehrmacht ,ultimately slowing down their advance towards Moscow (Braithwaite 227).
As Operation Typhoon moved into further into November, the weather was shifting to winter. The mud was freezing
and the German panzers were able to resume their advance, but they had already assumed 686,000 casualties
(Glantz 202). Hitler did order the Wehrmacht to resume their offensive on Moscow and they managed to take some
ground, but by this time the Soviet reserves were arriving from the East to fill in the defensive gaps. The senior
military leadership of the Soviet Union, Stavka, ordered in the early November the creation of “9 reserve armies
and, simultaneously 9 tank brigades, 49 separate tank battalions, and over 100 ski battalions by December 1 along
with 90,000 individual replacements for theWestern and Kalinin Front.” (Glantz 227-9)
The Russians were also making use of their ability to move again and they were reinforcing their defensive line with
men who were outfitted to white camouflage and clothing suitable for the harsh winter. Their misadventure in Finland
had revealed their unpreparedness for winter and they were keen on righting their mistakes (Braithwaite 289).
The Russians had bulked up their defense line with more guns and more tanks. Not all of the terrain on the Mozhaisk Defense Line was frozen and the mud made it impossible for the bulk of the Russian tanks to mount a counter attack.
It was still possible however for the Soviets to mount a cavalry attack with the aid of several T-34 tanks against the
German Panzers outflanking the great General Guderian (Braithwaite 294).
By December the Germans’ offensive had been suppressed. Both the German and Soviet forces were greeted by a severe drop in temperature reaching the negatives. This change in the weather was also when Stavka ordered the commencement of the Soviet counter offensive to be launched from the Western and Kalinin Front on December 5th. The fighting was brutal and the both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were locked in a war of attrition. The temperature was below 15 degrees and neither side saw a slack in the fighting. There were many technical issues due to the cold. Some of the German Panzers and lorries’ engines though running would suddenly shut down, the oil in the motors freezing. Additionally, there was snow that prevented the Panzers and infantry from being resupplied by the Luftwaffe (Glantz 232-5).
The Red Army was also on the move and Zhukov and other Stavka generals issued a directive to their commanders to always pursue. This tactic was to ensure that the Wehrmacht was always harassed and never able to let down their guard. However, they did not order them into a frontal attack, but instead encourage them to surround the German forces (Glantz 237). This dogged tactic could only be maintained because new men and equipment were flowing into region with each new day. The Soviet generals though facing severe pressure from General Secretary Stalin were slow and methodical in their efforts to destroy the Wehrmacht in front of Moscow. By December 16th, the Red Army had rolled back the German forces between 150-330 kilometers from the capital. Hitler’s generals began to request permission to retreat, but the Fuhrer remained steadfast in his dream to wipe from the earth the Soviet ideology that stood in direct conflict with the Nazi’s National Socialism. On Christmas day, General Guderian was relieved of his command. The Red Army continued to push tirelessly into the retreating Wehrmacht. By New Year’s Day it was apparent that Operation Typhoon had been a failure and the Soviet Union had changed the tide of the war and stole victory out of the hands of defeat (Glantz 246-250).